Test scores) with debate scholarships. The Spicer Debate Forum competes in two year-long policy debate formats: ndt and nfa-ld. We’ve national semis or finals in both in the last decade.


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NameTest scores) with debate scholarships. The Spicer Debate Forum competes in two year-long policy debate formats: ndt and nfa-ld. We’ve national semis or finals in both in the last decade.
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MSDI 2015

#debatelikeabear Deferred Action Neg v1.0

About MSDI & Missouri State U..


For twenty years, the Missouri State Debate Institute has offered an excellent educational experience in the middle of the high school topic. MSDI is distinct from other camps in six ways. First, our skills focus assures that a typical 2-week debater gets nearly 80 speeches, including over 20 debates. Second, we emphasize the largest cases on topic, with students getting both aff and neg rounds on each. Third, our senior faculty are comparable with top lab leaders in any camp. Fourth, MSDI students can earn highly transferable college credit in public speaking for a minimal cost. Fifth, we respect variance in home debate circuits – our goal is to improve line by line debating in ways that will help students no matter who judges in their home circuit. Finally, our price is below any comparable camp and far below most camps. Our 2016 information will be available shortly at: http://debate.missouristate.edu/camp.htm.

Missouri State University is a large comprehensive university (enrollment over 24k), with nearly any major you might want. The university has excellent academic scholarship support – most debaters combine academic “entitlement” scholarships (guaranteed based on GPA/test scores) with debate scholarships. The Spicer Debate Forum competes in two year-long policy debate formats: NDT and NFA-LD. We’ve national semis or finals in both in the last decade. Our debaters have an average GPA over 3.5, a 97% graduation rate, and 70% complete law/grad school afterward. Our program is a high-impact academic experience with an exceptional alumni network. Please contact Dr. Eric Morris for more information (EricMorris@MissouriState.edu).

http://debate.missouristate.edu/

http://www.missouristate.edu/FinancialAid/scholarships/

Deferred Action Neg v1.0


About MSDI & Missouri State U.. 1

Deferred Action Neg v1.0 2

**Solvency** 3

No registration 4

CiR turn 5

Plan is illegal 6

**Economy** 8

DAPA can’t solve 9

Economy growing 10

Agriculture not key 12

A2 Unions 13

US not key to global 14

Economy resilient 15

1NC Economy – no war 18

2NC Economy – no war 20

1NC Econ not key to heg 23

1NC Hegemony defense 24

2NC Hegemony defense 25

**Agriculture** 26

Agriculture turn 27

Mechanization turn 29

Labor shortage inevitable 31

US not key to global ag 32

Food shortage inevitable 33

1NC No resource wars 34

2NC No resource wars 35

**State Budgets** 36

A2 Bioterror 37

**DA** 39

Unpopular 40

Courts link to politics 42

Terror DA 44


**Solvency**

No registration

No solvency – people won’t sign up


Shoba S. Wadhia, Samuel Weiss Faculty Scholar and Clinical Professor of Law at Penn State Law, 2015. "The History of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law." American University Law Review 64

The political impetus to challenge the legality of the President’s executive actions stems in part from the number of people who may qualify for these actions—especially from the creation of the DAPA program. Estimates from the White House suggest that more than 4 million people will benefit from the President’s executive actions.73 Notably, although the scale of President Obama’s executive actions is significant, they do not reflect something new as a legal matter nor do they confirm that the actual number of eligible people who will apply or may receive DAPA will even come close to 4 million. In the case of DACA, for example, just fifty-five percent of the estimated 1.2 million eligible individuals applied for the program after it had been in place for two years.74 Some of the reasons an eligible person may choose not to apply for a program include the inability to pay the application fee, fear of deportation for oneself or a family member(s), inability to obtain the documents necessary to prove eligibility, or lack of access to an immigration attorney or non-profit group because of a cultural, language, and/or geographic barrier.75 Possibly, the new deferred action programs will undergo an even larger drop in applications because of the confusion and fear surrounding the temporary injunction issued by Judge Hanen and the ongoing removals of noncitizens identified as enforcement priorities.76

Deferred action is perceived as vulnerable – chills participation even if the decision is reversed


Anil Kalhan, Associate Law Prof @ Drexel University, February 21, 2015 , Is Judge Hanen's Smackdown of Executive Action on Immigration 'Narrowly Crafted'?. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2571079 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2571079

What exactly is at stake in whether or not Judge Hanen’s ruling is characterized as a narrow and minimalist ruling? In instrumental terms, both critics and defenders of the Obama administration’s initiatives have incentives to characterize the decision as a narrow one. For defenders of the administration’s initiatives, characterizing Judge Hanen’s decision as narrow might help to forestall a potential “chilling effect” in immigrant communities that could result from any impression that Judge Hanen has dealt a fatal blow to those programs. From this perspective, if immigrant communities perceive DAPA and expanded DACA as vulnerable, then individuals who are eligible for DAPA and expanded DACA might be intimidated from applying if and when the programs are reinstated. That chilling effect could also extend to applications to renew deferred action under the original DACA program, even though that program is not affected by Judge Hanen’s ruling.

No signup – perceived risk of rollback


Josh Gerstein and Adam B. Lerner, 5-26-2015, "Ruling puts Obama's immigration legacy in jeopardy," POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/story/2015/05/barack-obama-executive-action-immigration-setback-appeals-court-118290.html, accessed 6-23-2015, jwh

One former top immigration official says that regardless of the eventual outcome of the litigation, the delay is likely to undermine the willingness of immigrants to take the much-vaunted step out of the shadows.

“I think the longer the program languishes the more uncertainty is going to build. That’s going to create a reluctance for people to come forward and participate,” said Paul Virtue, a former immigration service chief counsel now with law firm Mayer Brown.

CiR turn

The plan prevents comprehensive immigration reform


Geoffrey Heeren, Associate Professor, Valparaiso University Law School, 2015 "The Status of Nonstatus." American University Law Review 64

On the other hand, nonstatus could calcify. The ability of millions of undocumented individuals to obtain nonstatus might reduce the pressure to pass actual immigration reform. Business interests that have historically lobbied for reform might be appeased by the existence of a large new lawful work force.322 The tenuous nature of nonstatus might prevent its holders from pushing too hard for something better for fear of losing what they have. Even if nonstatus becomes status for the most politically popular groups, like those with DACA, less visible and less politically connected groups will likely be left out. The dangers of this situation need to be recognized. Those with nonstatus will contribute to the country’s tax revenue without receiving their fair share of benefits, such as health care, and for some, social security retirement. They will be more likely to suffer discrimination and less likely to be protected by the courts. On the other hand, DHS will grow from nonstatus, gaining more and more officers to process millions of work permit renewal requests.323 DHS has even claimed that it might be able to shift some of the fees from DAPA to fund ICE’s and CBP’s enforcement efforts—growing those agencies, too.324 Although the immigration enforcement agencies may be nourished by nonstatus, nonstatus may guarantee that the United States will never solve its problem of unauthorized immigration. The Executive Branch justifies most of its nonstatus programs as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the face of an unauthorized population that is larger than what the government is capable of deporting. In order for it to keep granting nonstatus, therefore, the government must always be faced with a massive undocumented population.325 Those undocumented immigrants who do not qualify for nonstatus will likely be subject to a new regime of hyperenforcement with ever-larger levels of resources directed against them.

Plan is illegal

DAPA/DACA is illegal – contradicts Congress, no limiting principle, INA doesn’t justify


Ian Smith, 5-29-2015, Obama Is Suspending the Law Designed to Deter Illegal Immigration, National Review Online, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/419030/need-limiting-principle-amnesty-discretion

A key part of the Fifth Circuit’s decision to keep the freeze on President Obama’s amnesty programs was the 25-page dissenting opinion written by the panel’s lone Obama appointee. Not only does it point to how the bloc-voting liberal justices of the Supreme Court will ultimately treat the case, it almost wholly focuses on the threshold issue of “prosecutorial discretion”: an executive-branch power that, if expanded to include mass grants of amnesty, would remove the last vestige of authority that Congress and the courts have in preventing immigration anarchy at our nation’s southern border. The “essential point of disagreement” that Judge Stephen Higginson had with Judge Hanen’s lower-court opinion has to do with the characterization of the president’s amnesty programs. How DAPA and DACA are categorized is crucial for both sides. Obama’s attorneys contend that the programs are mere exercises of “prosecutorial discretion” on the part of the president. The core case that “forecloses plaintiffs’ arguments” against the administration’s use of DAPA and DACA, wrote Judge Higginson, is Heckler v. Chaney, where the Supreme Court held that “an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce . . . is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.” Finding that these programs were something bigger than mere decisions not to prosecute, Judge Hanen determined that the Heckler ruling couldn’t apply to the president’s amnesty. Higginson quotes Hanen’s characterization of DACA and DAPA, emphasizing that he called them “announced programs of non-enforcement of the law that contradicts Congress’s statutory goals” and an “abdication of [the government’s] statutory responsibilities.” The descriptor “announced” is essential here, and Higginson is right to focus on Hanen’s characterization so intently. “Prosecutorial discretion” refers to the priorities prosecutors sometimes must adopt (almost always in the context of criminal prosecutions) given the operational limits they face. The Department of Homeland Security has appropriated this concept, asserting that by being able to prosecute illegal aliens according to its own discretion, rather than the guidelines set forth in our immigration laws, it can save its “limited resources” and better “prioritize” cases that deserve the most attention — e.g., convicted felons, illegal aliens who are threats to national security, and so on. But such priorities are not usually “announced” by prosecutors. As liberal law professor (and immigration attorney) Peter Margulies writes, the decision to exercise discretion in dealing with wrongdoers necessarily must be done “in the dark,” not out in the open (as in a nationwide memo). To announce such an intention is to create “moral hazard,” the concept most commonly used to describe the unintended consequences of insurance. As Margulies says, “moral hazard arises because individuals who know they will be held harmless for wrongdoing tend to do more of it” (emphasis added). Letting wrongdoers, such as illegal aliens, apply in advance for a “fixed period of forbearance” (deferred action) would lead to more of the bad behavior in question, such as overstaying a visa or crossing the border without appropriate documents. Take the case of burglary, says Margulies. If a person charged with burglary is young and his theft was small, a judge may favor a plea bargain instead of sentencing him to prison. But “it would be difficult to imagine,” writes Margulies, “prosecutors would solicit applications from known burglars for a ‘burglars’ holiday’ that would guarantee a specific period of immunity.” Any discretion that Congress allows for must have a “limiting principle” that narrowly confines the transfer of authority. The Immigration Nationality Act (INA) is a deterring statute. Since its original enactment in 1952, it has been continually amended to better deter illegal immigration. By announcing an “illegal aliens’ holiday,” the president created the moral hazard of giving a reprieve to illegal aliens, which has the result of suspending the deterring power of the INA. In a word, then, DAPA and DACA are an “abdication,” and Judge Hanen is absolutely right. Any discretion a president may have had in prosecuting illegal aliens and deferring deportations was taken away by the INA’s IIRIRA (Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act) amendments of 1996. Even open-borders pushers like the ACLU agree that the INA as written leads to “mass deportations”: That is the mandate given to DHS. Even Noam Chomsky agrees with this characterization. President Clinton, he says, “militarized” the border in the mid-Nineties in anticipation of the implementation of NAFTA. According to Chomsky, because independent Mexican farmers had no way to compete with subsidized U.S. agribusiness, the “likely consequence would be flight to the United States, joined by those fleeing the countries of Central America.” To say, as Higginson does, that the INA could possibly forgo its deterrence factor and authorize DAPA and DACA takes some serious mental gymnastics. Any discretion that Congress allows for must have a “limiting principle” that narrowly confines the transfer of authority in question, lest it simply become a runaway power grab. There is no such limitation in DAPA and DACA. Oddly, Judge Higginson inadvertently supports this argument when he claims throughout his dissent that the “Family Fairness” deferred-action program of 1990 provides legal precedent for the president’s amnesty. That program makes DAPA and DACA “neither new nor uncommon,” he says. Higginson, however, fails to discuss the limited applicability of that program. Family Fairness grew out of the legislative amnesty of 1986, when a small number of the beneficiaries’ dependents (mostly children) were left out because of an oversight. Importantly, those children were able to be sponsored after the beneficiaries became lawful permanent residents. Congress sought to correct this mistake by making provision for this class in the Immigration Act of 1990; in the interim (which lasted several months), members of this class, despite being illegal aliens, had their deportation proceedings stayed. As law professor Josh Blackman says, the program served as a “temporary bridge from one status to another,” with Congress granting the children legal status almost immediately after it was put in place. Beneficiaries of DAPA and DACA, by contrast, have no prospect of obtaining proper legal status. When another Obama-appointed judge, Beryl Howell of the D.C. District Court, raised Family Fairness as “precedent” in her dismissal of Arizona sheriff Joe Arpaio’s DACA challenge, Margulies said she “failed to acknowledge the distinction between discretion that acted as a bridge to legal status and discretion unmoored to status” (emphasis added). Deferring prosecution for a narrowly defined group of people whose change in status is all but inevitable is the kind of temporary and limited discretion that Congress arguably can give to the president. But deferring prosecution for large groups of people is what makes Obama’s amnesty completely unhinged and a reviewable abdication of duty.
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